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ABSTRACT
Although institutions are believed to be key determinants of economic performance, there is limited
evidence on how they can be successfully reformed. Evaluating the effects of specific reforms is complicated
by the lack of exogenous variation in the presence of institutions; the difficulty of empirically measuring
institutional performance; and the temptation to “cherry pick” a few novel treatment effect estimates
from amongst the large number of indicators required to capture the complex and multi-faceted subject.
We evaluate one attempt to make local institutions more egalitarian by imposing minority participation
requirements in Sierra Leone and test for longer term learning-by-doing effects. In so doing, we address
these three pervasive challenges by: exploiting the random assignment of a participatory local governance
intervention, developing innovative real-world outcomes measures, and using a pre-analysis plan to
bind our hands against data mining. The specific program under study is a “community driven development”
(CDD) project, which has become a popular strategy amongst donors to improve local institutions
in developing countries. We find positive short-run effects on local public goods provision and economic
outcomes, but no sustained impacts on collective action, decision-making processes, or the involvement
of marginalized groups (like women) in local affairs, indicating that the intervention was ineffective
at durably reshaping local institutions. We further show that in the absence of a pre-analysis plan,
we could have instead generated two highly divergent, equally erroneous interpretations of the impacts—one
positive, one negative—of external aid on institutions.
Katherine Casey





Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
MIT Department of Economics
E60-275




University of California, Berkeley








1.  Introduction 
Many scholars have argued that the accountability and inclusiveness of government institutions 
are key determinants of economic performance.  In particular, institutions that are egalitarian and 
protect individual rights have been tied to better economic outcomes in India (Banerjee and Iyer 
2004),  Brazil  and  the  United  States  (Engerman  and  Sokoloff  1997),  and  former  European 
colonies  (Acemoglu,  Johnson  and  Robinson  2001).    However,  there  is  no c onsensus  on  the 
specific  policy  reforms  that  will  successfully  engender  better  functioning  institutions,  or  on 
whether it is possible (or desirable) for external actors like foreign aid donors to reshape local 
power  dynamics  in  less  developed  countries.  This  debate  has  played  out  vigorously  in 
discussions on aid policy reform: while some scholars argue that large infusions of foreign aid 
can themselves help build stronger institutions (Sachs 2005), others assert that historically rooted 
local  institutions  and  social  norms  are  difficult  to  understand,  let  alone  transform  (Easterly 
2006), and that attempts by outsiders to create “better” institutions will be futile. 
Progress  toward  resolving  this  debate  is  complicated  by  the  difficulty  of  measuring 
institutional performance empirically, where change in institutional structure is rarely exogenous 
and the subject matter is difficult to pin down.  The amorphous and contextually determined 
nature of institutions means that there are few standard indicators to draw from, and reliance on 
subjective measures risks bias from “halo effects” (see Olken 2009 on corruption measurement).  
Moreover,  their  multi-dimensionality  leads  to  the  collection  of  a  large  number  of  outcome 
variables, tempting the researcher to “cherry pick” the handful of results that will be statistically 
significant by random chance. In this paper we rigorously evaluate one attempt to transform local 
institutions in Sierra Leone.  To address these measurement challenges, we exploit a randomly 
assigned governance intervention, develop objective real-world measures of institutions, and use 
a pre-analysis plan to bind our hands against data mining.  
Among foreign aid donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments in 
less developed countries today, imposing participation requirements to enhance the position of 
marginalized  groups  has  become  a  popular  strategy  to  promote  the  inclusiveness  and 
accountability of local institutions.  Giving greater representation to minority groups aims to 
foster learning-by-doing and demonstration effects that empower its members over the longer 
term. While skeptics might argue that the position of underrepresented groups will only change 2 
 
in the long-run if there are changes in underlying political power, demonstration effects have 
been found to be successful in enhancing the participation of women in India (Beamen et al. 
2009).  To test these questions, we evaluate a “community driven development” (CDD) project 
that combines block grants for local public goods with intensive training and requirements on 
minority inclusion designed to catalyze collective action and empower marginalized groups in 
local decision-making.  Random assignment of the program presents a convenient opportunity to 
study exogenous variation in institutional reform, as well as evaluate the efficacy of the vast 
sums  of  aid  currently  channeled  through  these  programs;  Mansuri  and  Rao  (forthcoming) 
estimate that the World Bank alone has spent 50 billion U.S. dollars on CDD initiatives over the 
past ten  years.  This type of governance reform attempts to bolster local coordination – for 
example,  by  setting up  village development committees (VDC)  and  plans – and  to  enhance 
participation and inclusion, by requiring women and “youths” (adults aged 18 to 35) to attend 
project meetings and hold leadership positions.  As arguments in favor of local ownership relate 
to those behind fiscal decentralization, CDD is often used to provide “bottom up” support for 
broader decentralization reforms in practice. 
Yet while advocates of participatory local governance promise a long and varied list of 
benefits – ranging from more cost-effective construction of local infrastructure, to a closer match 
between project choice and village needs, to the weakening of authoritarian village institutions
1 – 
critics  hold  concomitant  concerns  that  participation  requirements  serve  as  a  regressive  tax, 
widening political participation will clog up rather than expedite decision-making (Olson 1982), 
external resources may attract new leaders and crowd out the more disadvantaged (Gugerty and 
Kremer 2008), and that these additional resources will be captured by elites if the program is 
unable to change the nature of de facto political power (Bardhan 2002). While researchers have 
begun to explore these claims, few studies provide rigorous evidence on the real-world impacts 
of community driven development projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). 
This paper studies a large-scale randomized local governance project that was part of the 
Government of Sierra Leone’s broader reform agenda to strengthen participatory democracy and 
decentralize  public  services.  As  background,  scholars  attribute  the  incompetence  and  elite 
                                                 
1 For instance, Dongier et al. (2003) write that: “Experience demonstrates that by directly relying on poor 
people to drive development activities, CDD has the potential to  make poverty reduction efforts  more 
responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective than traditional centrally 
led programs…achieving immediate and lasting results at the grassroots level.” 
 3 
 
domination of Sierra Leone’s institutions – both the formal state and the traditional chieftaincy 
system – in the 1970’s and 80’s as key contributors to the brutal civil war that ensued from 1991 
to 2002 (Richards 1996, Keen 2003).  Emerging from war with widespread poverty and a dearth 
of  public  services,  the  country  fell  to  the  very  bottom  of  the  United  Nations  Development 
Program Human Development Index that measures standards of living, health and education 
(United Nations 2004).  Housed within the government’s Decentralization Secretariat and funded 
by the World Bank, the particular project we study, “GoBifo” (or “Move Forward” in Krio, 
Sierra  Leone’s  lingua  franca),  provided  both  what  we  in  this  paper  call  “hardware”  and 
“software”  support  to  rural  communities.  The  hardware  included  block  grants  of  $4,667, o r 
roughly  $100 per  household, for  constructing  local  public  goods  and  sponsoring  trade  skills 
training and small business start-up capital. Akin to community organizers in the U.S., GoBifo 
program  facilitators  also  provided  “software”:  technical  assistance  that  promoted  democratic 
decision-making, the participation of socially marginalized women and youth in local politics, 
and transparent budgeting practices. While the objective of making local government institutions 
more participatory aimed to address some of the perceived root causes of the civil war, GoBifo’s 
design is similar to many other CDD projects in non-post-conflict societies. 
This paper assesses the extent to which GoBifo achieved its goals of improving local 
governance  in  rural Sierra  Leone  communities,  and  in  so  doing  makes two  contributions of 
general interest, and two contributions specific to the development economics literature. The first 
broad contribution is the use of a pre-analysis plan.  The research and project teams agreed to a 
set of hypotheses regarding the likely areas of program impacts in 2005 before the intervention 
began.  As the project came to a close in 2009, we fleshed out this document with the exact 
outcome measures and econometric specifications that we would use to evaluate success, and 
archived  this  pre-analysis  plan  before  analyzing  the  follow-up  data   ( see  supplementary 
Appendix A).  Our decision to adhere rigorously to this plan eliminates the risk of data mining or 
other selective presentation of empirical results (“cherry-picking”), and generates correctly sized 
statistical tests, bolstering the scientific credibility of the findings. Moreover, such registration of 
experimental  trials  helps  to  round  out  the  body  of  evidence  available  to  researchers  and 
practitioners,  mitigating  the  publication  bias  that  arises  from  underreporting  of  null  or 
inconclusive results.  Registration of medical trials, including a pre-analysis plan, is required by 4 
 
U.S. law but, to our knowledge, this is among the first economics studies to adopt this approach.
2 
The  second  general  contribution  is  the  creation  of  new  objective  measures  of  local 
institutions and collective action.  We combine rich household survey data with novel “structured 
community activities” (SCAs) that introduce three concrete, real-world scenarios that allow us to 
observe and measure how communities: (i) respond to a matching grant opportunity to purchase 
building materials at a subsidized price; (ii) make a communal decision between two comparable 
alternatives; and (iii) allocate a valuable asset (provided for free) among community members. 
We  feel  that  these  SCAs  capture  actual  local  collective  action  capacity,  and  uncover  the 
decision-making processes that underlie it, more accurately than lab experiments, hypothetical 
vignettes or survey reports alone. The fact that these activities were carried out after the GoBifo 
program (and its financial resources) had ended allows us to isolate any persistent impacts on 
collective action and institutional performance generated by the program. We are unaware of 
other studies that have used these SCAs in practice, and believe they may be useful tools for 
other researchers interested in unobtrusively and objectively measuring local institutions. 
A third contribution of particular interest to development economists and practitioners is 
a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation of a CDD project, which is important given the billions 
of  dollars  currently  dedicated  to  this  type  of  external  assistance.    We  use  a  randomized 
experimental research design, which produces rigorous evidence on causal impacts in a relatively 
large study sample of 236 villages and 2,832 households.  The extended timeframe of our study 
over four years (2005-2009) allows us to assess longer run impacts on institutional outcomes 
than is typically possible.  While four years may be short in comparison to the lifetimes over 
which current institutions developed, it is not short in comparison to the time scales of most 
community development or other externally funded projects, or compared to learning-by-doing 
effects documented elsewhere. To guide our empirical work, we develop a theoretical framework 
for  understanding  the  mechanisms  through  which  financial  assistance  and  participation 
requirements might impact public goods and collective action both during and after the program. 
                                                 
2The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 launched this initiative and led to the creation of the 
NIH-sponsored web registry clinicaltrials.gov in 2000.  The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 expands coverage to a broader group of trails, requires results reporting and imposes financial penalties for 
non-compliance.  Moreover, since 2005, registration of clinical trials is a prerequisite for publication in any member 
journal of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors.  There are even further calls in medicine (Lancet 
2010) and epidemiology (Bracken 2011) to register protocols for observational studies.  The U.S. Department of 
Education Institute of Education Sciences launched a trail registry, although the information requirements and 
incentives are weaker than those found in medicine.  See also Simes (1986) and Horton and Smith (1999). 5 
 
As most existing evaluations of these kinds of projects have been relatively atheoretical, we 
believe this model could be useful in interpreting the findings of other studies as well. 
Fourth and finally, we provide additional evidence to the growing literature that explores 
the potential demonstration effects of giving minorities control over decisions and resources.  
Research in India suggests that giving women and members of scheduled castes positions of 
political power shifts the composition of public spending toward goods preferred by these groups 
(Chattopadhyay  and  Duflo  2004,  Pande  2003)  and  reduces  statistical  discrimination  against 
female candidates (Beamen et al. 2009).  By contrast, we find that requiring women and young 
adults to take on leadership positions, attend project meetings, and sign off on project finances 
does not have any lingering effect on their participation in local decision-making or on social 
norms regarding their leadership ability.  One explanation for this difference may be that while 
Indian political reservations give representatives of historically excluded groups real power over 
resources as part of a formal state body (the panchayat), CDD takes a more indirect approach to 
de  jure  reforms—nudging  communities  to  become  more  democratic  and  inclusive  without 
explicitly attempting to weaken elites—and may in reality not change the identity of de facto 
local power holders (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).  Perhaps because sidelining the chiefs was 
not a program goal, male elders and chiefdom officials retained just as much control over village 
development  committees  in  GoBifo  communities  as  they  held  over  comparable  organizing 
bodies in control areas, despite requirements that women attend meetings and play a role in 
project management. 
Our  analysis  explores  an  exceptionally  wide  range  of  outcome  measures,  which  we 
divide into two broad groups: “hardware” or local public infrastructure outcomes (which we call 
family A), and “software” or institutional and collective action outcomes (family B). Under the 
first family, we find that the GoBifo project was well implemented: it successfully established 
the village-level organizations and tools to manage development projects in nearly all cases, and 
provided communities with the financing to implement them.  The distribution of project benefits 
within communities was equitable for the most part, and the leakage of project resources was 
minimal.  We further find immediate impacts on local public goods infrastructure.  There is also 
more market activity in treatment communities, including the presence of more traders and items 
for sale, suggesting short-run economic gains. 
However,  such  implementation  and  hardware  gains  appear  insufficient  to  generate 6 
 
changes in for the second, arguably more important, domain of institutional reform.  Here we 
find no evidence that the program led to fundamental changes in the “software” of collective 
action (family B) – namely, the ability to raise funds for local public goods, decision-making 
processes, or even social attitudes and norms. As an example, despite the new experiences many 
women in treatment villages gained by participating in GoBifo activities, they were no more 
likely to voice an opinion during observed community meetings after the project ended or to play 
a leading decision-making role (using a variety of metrics). Similarly, the establishment of a 
democratically elected village development committee that carried out multiple projects did not 
lead treatment villages to be any more successful at raising funds in response to the matching 
grant opportunity. These patterns, and the lack of significant effects across many other outcomes, 
indicate that the program did not reshape village institutions, empower minorities, or improve 
collective action beyond the activities directly stipulated by the project itself.  The time horizon 
of the research over four years suggests that these results cannot be dismissed simply as the 
result of a short term study. 
The finding that a well-implemented project with beneficial public goods and economic 
impacts did not trigger broader spillover effects on institutions and norms resonates with the 
mixed results seen in the emerging empirical literature on CDD programs. In the Philippines, 
Labonne  and  Chase  (2008)  find  that  CDD  increased  participation  in  village  assemblies  and 
interaction between residents and village leaders but did not initiate broader social change, and in 
fact, may have crowded out other avenues for collective action.  Voss (2008) uncovers mixed 
impacts of the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesian household welfare and 
access to services.  Focusing on roads constructed under the same KDP project, Olken (2007) 
finds that enhanced top down project monitoring—through guaranteed government audits—was 
more  effective  in  reducing  corruption  than  increased  grassroots  participation  in  village-level 
accountability meetings between residents and project officials.  A related set of papers exploring 
the impacts of community mobilization on public service providers similarly finds mixed results 
with strong positive effects seen for healthcare in Uganda (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009) but no 
effect  on e ducation  in  India  (Banerjee  et  al.  2010).   M ost  similar  to  our  study  context  and 
methods,  Fearon,  Humphreys  and  Weinstein  (2009)  concurrently  conducted  a  randomized 
evaluation of a community driven post-war reconstruction project in Liberia in 83 communities.  
Their basic result of positive impacts on collective action and social cohesion – as measured by 7 
 
greater contributions to an experimental public goods game in the mixed-gender treatment arm 
(although there were no impacts in the women-only treatment arm) and reduced self-reports of 
inter-group  tensions  –  accompanied  by  little  effect  on  material  welfare,  appears  quite  the 
opposite of our findings.  To explain this divergence, they note that the program they study 
explicitly forbade the income generating initiatives that many GoBifo  communities chose to 
implement.  Moreover, their public goods game may have more directly mimicked the NGO’s 
intervention while our SCAs aimed to capture shifts in more general institutional practices and 
behaviors.  Crucially, though, neither study finds compelling evidence of program spillovers on 
real-world, non-project collective activities including contributing to existing public goods (such 
as road maintenance, schools and wells), and attending or speaking up in community meetings. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  Sierra  Leone 
context, the GoBifo intervention, and a theoretical framework of local collective action under a 
CDD  program.  Section  3 c overs  the  research  design,  pre-analysis  plan  and  econometric 
specifications.  Section 4 discusses the empirical results and accompanying robustness checks, 
and the final section concludes. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1. Institutions in Sierra Leone 
Before  describing  the  aims  and  content  of  the  GoBifo  program,  let  us  first  consider  why 
participatory local government advocates might argue that existing institutions in Sierra Leone 
warrant reform.  At a high level, the country has a dual system of governance (common in many 
African countries, Mamdani 1996) in which the national state apparatus based in the capital runs 
in parallel to the “traditional” local chieftaincy system, neither of which has historically been 
particularly democratic or inclusive.  Regarding the former, authoritarian leaders in the 1970’s 
and  1980’s  enriched  themselves  through  illicit  diamond  deals  while  providing  woefully 
inadequate  public  services  (Reno  1995).    President  Siaka  Stevens  dismantled  democratic 
institutions entirely, initially by abolishing elected district governments in 1972, and ultimately 
declaring the country a one-party state in 1978.  One-party rule continued until the 1992 coup 
that roughly coincided with the start of the civil war (which ran from 1991 to 2002).   
As background on the traditional system, the 149 paramount chiefs come from hereditary 
“ruling houses”; they serve for life once appointed or elected; and exert considerable control over 8 
 
resource allocation, including land and labor, as well as the local court system that reigns outside 
the capital.  Many local public goods (such as road maintenance and community schools) are 
provided  by  local  fundraising  organized  through  traditional  systems  at  the  village  level. 
Dominated  by  male  elders,  this  system  has  continued  to  the  present  day  to  largely  exclude 
women (who are not even eligible to serve as chiefs in much of the country) and young men 
from decision-making.  Political exclusion, growing frustration with government incompetence 
and corruption, and grievances against heavy-handed chiefs are seen as destabilizing factors that 
contributed to war (Richards 1996, Keen 2003).  
Emerging  from  the  civil  war  with  dismal  standards  of  living,  health  and  education 
(United Nations 2004), the government and its donor partners oversaw major reforms to restore 
multi-party democracy and stimulate economic growth.  One of the most high-profile reforms 
was the reconstitution of district-level government in 2004 after over thirty years of dormancy.  
Housed within the government’s Decentralization Secretariat, the GoBifo project was launched 
as a pilot initiative to extend this broader decentralization reform to even more local levels, 
providing  funds  and  technical  assistance  to  wards  and  villages.
3    To  formally  link  project 
activities to higher tiers of government, Village Development Committees (VDC) were required 
to  submit  their  village  development  plans  to  the  appropriate  Ward  Development  Committee 
(WDC) for review, endorsement and onward transmission to the district council for approval 
(GoBifo Project 2007).  The government’s broader reform agenda and joint sponsorship of the 
project (with the World Bank) gave weight to GoBifo’s objectives of making local institutions 
more participatory and democratic.  
 
2.2 The GoBifo Project 
As mentioned in the introduction, the GoBifo project had two main components: i) financial 
assistance in the form of block grants of around five thousand dollars per village to sponsor local 
public  goods  provision  and  small  enterprise  development;  and  ii)  intensive  organizing  to 
establish new structures to facilitate collective action (i.e. Village Development Committees) and 
institute participation requirements to elevate historically marginalized groups to positions of 
authority.  As examples of the latter, GoBifo required that one of the three co-signatories on the 
                                                 
3 The WDCs are the lowest formal government administrative unit, covering around 10,000 citizens on average, and 
the elected district councilor representing the ward serves as the WDC chair.  While the project we study also 
operated at the ward level, only the village-level intervention was randomly assigned and is thus our focus.   9 
 
community  bank  account  be  female;  encouraged  women  and  youths  to  manage  their  own 
projects  (e.g.,  small  business  training  for  women);  made  evidence  of  inclusion  in  project 
implementation a prerequisite for the release of block grant funding tranches; and, as part of their 
internal review process, even required field staff to record how many women and youth attended 
and spoke up in meetings. 
The process of establishing new village institutions, training community members, and 
promoting social mobilization of marginalized groups was intense and accounted for a large part 
of GoBifo human and financial resources.  Specifically, all project facilitators were required to 
reside in one of the six villages assigned to them and spend approximately one day per week in 
each of the remaining villages.  After the start of project work in January 2006 and through the 
completion  of  all  village-level  projects  in July  2009,  each  village  thus  received  roughly  six 
months of direct “facilitation” over a three and a half year period (see the detailed timeline in 
Appendix B).  Furthermore, while just under half of the total GoBifo budget was dedicated to 
village-  and  ward-level  block  grants  (US$896,000  or  47%),  the  balance  covered  “capacity 
development” in village- and ward-level planning (US$589,732 or 30%), project management 
and contingencies (US$255,320 or 14%), and monitoring and evaluation (US$177,300 or 9%).  
Thus for every dollar spent directly on actual construction or small business projects, roughly 
one dollar was spent on capacity-building, facilitation and oversight. 
GoBifo village projects were carried out in several areas.  The largest share of projects, at 
43%, was in the construction of local public goods, with 14% in community centers or sports 
fields,  12%  in  education  (i.e.,  primary  school  repairs),  10%  in  water  and  sanitation  (e.g., 
latrines), 5% in health (including traditional midwife posts), and 2% in roads.  Another 26% was 
in agriculture, including seed multiplication and communal farming; 14% in livestock or fishing 
(i.e., goat herding); and 17% in skills training and small business development initiatives in 
blacksmithing, carpentry, and soap making.  Leakage of GoBifo funds also appears minimal: 
when we asked villagers to verify the detailed financial reports that were given to the research 
team by project management, community members were able to confirm receipt for 86.5% of the 
273 transactions that were cross-checked.
4 
                                                 
4The discrepancies were of two types: i) the amounts in community records was markedly less than in project 
accounts; or ii) community members reported receiving building materials in kind and could not estimate their 
value.  For each of the disputed transactions, the GoBifo accounting team produced hard copy payment vouchers 
signed by both a village representative (either the VDC Chair or Finance Officer) and a project field staff member. 10 
 
The GoBifo project is quite representative of CDD initiatives in other less developed 
countries.  The  project  implementation  stages—establishing  a  local  committee,  providing 
facilitation that aims to shift social norms, and allocating block grants—are quite standard, as is 
the  pervasive  emphasis  on i nclusive,  transparent  and  participatory  processes.   C ompared  to 
projects studied in other countries (Olken 2007, Labonne and Chase 2008), the most notable 
programmatic difference is that the village-level component of GoBifo did not involve any inter-
community competition for funding.  Regarding the scale of funding, GoBifo disbursed grants 
worth a bit under $5,000 to communities with 50 households, or 300 residents, on average (so 
roughly $100 per household, or $16 per capita over three and a half years).
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2.3 A Framework of Collective Action and External Aid 
We  next  lay  out  a s tylized  local  collective  action  framework  that  clarifies  how  an  external 
intervention that provides financing and participation requirements might change local decision 
making and institutions, and derive implications that then structure our empirical analysis (see 
Appendix C for the formal exposition).  In the model, a social planner determines the optimal 
investment in local public goods and sets a corresponding tax schedule, which is implemented 
with  perfect  compliance.    Individual  residents  then  decide  whether  or  not  to  voluntarily 
participate  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  the  public  goods  projects,  taking  their 
individual tax burden as given. We feel this framework is a reasonable approximation to the 
context of rural Sierra Leone (and similar societies with strong village headmen), where the 
traditional chief has the authority to levy fines and collect taxes to provide basic public goods, 
but  there  is  variation  in  how  involved  residents  are  in  actual  decision  making  and 
implementation. In this setting, the external intervention lowers the marginal cost of local public 
goods provision through financial subsidies, and affects the fixed costs of collective action by 
imposing  participation  requirements  and  instilling  democratic  norms.  We  allow  for 
underrepresented  groups (i.e., women) to have  differential participation costs ex ante, which 
could be impacted by learning-by-doing or demonstration effects during project implementation.   
We define three time periods that correspond to our data collection activities: the pre-
                                                 
5 The Fearon et al. (2009) Liberia project provided roughly $20,000 to “communities” that comprised around four 
villages with two to three thousand residents, so $8 per capita over two years; and villages received $8,800 in 
Indonesia (Olken 2007). While the difference in total grant size may affect the maximum feasible project scale, the 
per capita funding differences are not substantial. 11 
 
program period when the baseline survey was fielded; the program implementation phase, where 
the first follow-up survey captured activities that had been completed during the intervention 
(and  launched  the  structured  community  activities);  and  the  post-program  period,  where  the 
second follow-up survey explored what happened with the SCAs after the project had finished. 
As the marginal cost reductions are tied directly to external financial assistance, while the fixed 
organizing cost reductions could be internalized and maintained, we can speculatively gain some 
leverage  over  which  channels  are  at  work  by  comparing  impacts  during  and  after  project 
implementation.    Moreover,  studying  the  post-program  period  allows  us  to  evaluate  the 
persistence and “sustainability” of impacts. 
First consider the individual’s decision of whether to contribute time and voluntary labor 
to the planning and implementation of local public goods.  While these decisions are taken in a 
decentralized fashion, they allow them to aggregate in a way that affects the costs of public 
goods provision facing the social planner.  The fact that individuals ignore the aggregate effect of 
their voluntary labor captures the classic externality feature of collective action, and implies that 
even with perfect tax compliance, the planner will still not be able to achieve the first-best level 
of local public goods provision.   
Individuals gain utility from consumption of the current stock of public goods, private 
consumption, and a psychic or social benefit of participating in collective action that captures the 
intrinsic value of civic involvement.  Regarding the latter, Olken (2010) and Dal Bό et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that having a say in the decision-making process can have a large effect on 
satisfaction and cooperation even if the choice process has no impact on the final policy outcome 
per se.  Given historical legacies of exclusion, we assume that while some women and youth 
may derive positive utility from participation, they face additional social costs of speaking up 
and thus, on average, their net benefits of civic participation are lower than for the traditional 
elder male elites.  All residents face the same opportunity cost of participating, which reflects the 
cost of time spent engaging in public goods provision instead of wage-earning activities, and 
must pay the tax set by the social planner.  The first order conditions imply that the individual 
thus chooses to participate in collective action if and only if the net benefits are nonnegative. 
The social planner chooses the level of local public goods investment with the objective 
of maximizing the sum of individual utilities. The cost of public goods provision has a marginal 
component, capturing the price of construction materials, as well as a fixed coordination cost of 12 
 
collective action, which is a function of both the sum of individual participation decisions and 
the  capacity  of  local  institutions.    Following  the  theory  motivating  participatory  local 
development, we assume that the fixed costs of collective action are falling in both the capacity 
of  local  institutions  and  community  participation;  we  assess  the  empirical  validity  of  these 
assumptions  below.   T he  latter  condition  would  be  true  if,  for  example,  greater  community 
involvement made public goods provision easier and if more involvement in decision making 
created  greater  support  for  the  process.  Importantly,  even  if  participation  has  no  effect  on 
coordination costs at all, advocates argue that local civic engagement carries intrinsic benefits, 
and therefore project participation belongs in the individual utility function and its enhancement 
becomes an appropriate objective for intervention.   
Standard first order conditions imply that the planner chooses the efficient level of local 
public goods investment if is affordable, or a smaller investment that exhausts the village budget 
(at a corner solution) if it is not.  Given the extremely limited public services in rural Sierra 
Leone,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  the  latter,  where  communities  face  a  binding  budget 
constraint that keeps public investment well below optimal levels.  This means that there are 
plenty  of  public  investments—in  latrines,  water  wells,  primary  schools—whose  village-wide 
marginal benefits exceed the marginal cost of construction, yet are simply unaffordable given the 
community’s  tax  base  and  inability  to  borrow  in  light  of  pervasive  financial  market 
imperfections.  Under  these  constraints,  profitable  investments  become  unaffordable  because 
construction prices and/or coordination costs are prohibitively high. 
Within this framework, participatory local governance interventions aim to have three 
separate impacts.  First, by subsidizing the cost of construction materials, the financial grants 
reduce  the  marginal  cost  of  public  goods  provision.  Second,  the  leadership  quotas  and 
participation requirements for women and youth aim to increase the benefits of participation for 
these historically marginalized groups. Such requirements should automatically translate into 
greater  participation  in  collective  activities  during  project  implementation  for  these  groups.  
Moreover,  if  women  and  young  men  learn-by-doing,  or  if  their  participation  exerts  positive 
demonstration effects on others that shifts social norms, this experience could trigger a persistent 
increase in their benefits of participation, sustainably raising  participation levels into the post-
program period. Third and finally, this increase in community participation, accompanied by the 
establishment of village development committees, plans and bank accounts, aims to reduce the 13 
 
fixed coordination costs of collective action.  The idea is that once an organizing body is in place 
and residents have reached consensus on local priorities, the next village project should be less 
costly to identify and execute. Note that this effect should be evident in both the implementation 
and post-program periods.  As such, the original GoBifo project funding proposal emphasizes the 
sustainability,  “durability”  and  broad  mandate  of  these  new  structures,  suggesting  they  will 
become  “the  focal  point  for  development  interventions”  and  other  forms  of  local  collective 
action in the future (World Bank 2004).  This description is consistent with more general claims 
by CDD advocates that a temporary intervention can permanently enhance local public goods 
provision by reducing the costs of collective action. 
This simple framework generates three empirical predictions to take to the data.  First, the 
combination of financial subsidies and lower coordination costs should unambiguously increase 
public goods investment during the program implementation phase.  To assess this, outcome 
family A includes project implementation indicators to first evaluate whether the grants were in 
fact  delivered  to  villages  and  new  institutions  established  on t he  ground,  and  then  a  set  of 
“hardware” measures regarding the stock of local public goods to assess immediate impacts on 
public investment levels.  Second, as we move from project implementation to the post-program 
period, the marginal investment costs return to baseline levels while the fixed costs (potentially) 
remain  permanently  reduced.   T o  evaluate  whether  the  establishment  of  durable  village 
institutions lead to continued greater investment in public goods in the post-program period, 
family B includes take-up of the building materials vouchers (in SCA #1), as well as several 
other measures of collective action beyond the direct program sphere.  Third, if participation 
requirements  for  women  and  youth  trigger  a  permanent  enhancement  in  their  benefits  from 
participation, we should see more women and youths attending community meetings and taking 
part in decision-making post-program.  This is captured by the “software” outcomes in the gift 
choice component of SCA #2 and household survey responses concerning civic engagement in 
non-program spheres.  Moreover, enhancing participation by marginalized groups could initiate 
broader changes in social norms and attitudes (for instance, regarding the desirability of female 
leadership), as captured in several additional hypotheses under outcome family B. 
 
3.  Research Design 
3.1. Random Assignment 14 
 
The 118 GoBifo treatment and 118 control villages were selected from a larger pool of eligible 
communities using a computerized random number generator. Two study districts were chosen 
to strike a balance in terms of regional diversity, political affiliation, and ethnic identity, while 
simultaneously targeting poor rural areas with limited NGO presence (see Appendix D for a 
map). Bombali district is located in the Northern region dominated by the Temne and Limba 
ethnic groups and traditionally allied with the All People’s Congress (APC) political party, one 
of Sierra Leone’s two largest parties.  Bonthe district is in the South, where the Mende and 
Sherbro ethnic groups dominate and where the population is historically aligned with the other 
major party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).  Using the 2004 Population and Housing 
Census, the eligible pool of villages was restricted to communities considered of appropriate size 
for a CDD project, namely between 20 and 200 households in Bombali and 10 to 100 households 
in Bonthe (where villages are smaller), and once the final study sample was chosen, the villages 
were randomized into treatment and control groups, stratifying on ward.
6 
For  each  community  in  the  study  sample,  government  Statistics  Sierra  Leone  staff 
randomly selected twelve households to be surveyed from the Census household lists. Given 
research  interest  in  the  dynamics  of  political  exclusion  and  empowerment,  the  choice  of 
respondent within each targeted household rotated among four different demographic groups in 
each subsequent household surveyed: non-youth male, youth male, non-youth female and youth 
female.   All  respondents  are  at  least  18  years  old,  and  note  that  the  Government  of  Sierra 
Leone’s  definition  of  youth  includes  people  up  to  35  years  of  age  (although  in  reality  the 
definition of youth is a bit subjective, especially since some respondents do not know their exact 
age).  This data collection strategy means that for each community, and for the overall sample, 
                                                 
6We ran 500 computer randomizations and saved all resulting assignments that generated no statistically significant 
differences (at 95% confidence) between treatment and control groups in terms of the total number of households 
per village and the distance to the nearest motorable road.  Among these “balanced” assignments, one was then 
selected at random for the final allocation of GoBifo treatment and control villages. Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) 
argue correctly that this process of re-randomization to achieve balance on observables may lead standard errors to 
be either under- or over-estimated. They show that correct inference can be achieved by including the “balancing” 
observables in the regression analysis as control variables, and these variables are thus included in our standard set 
of regression controls in all results presented below.  The treatment effect estimates are thus interpreted as impacts 
conditional on these observables. It is worth noting, however, that coefficient estimates and standard errors are 
nearly unchanged whether or not these controls are included in the analysis (not shown).There were two minor data 
issues in measuring community size and ward location that led to a partial re-sampling of a small number of 
villages, however these did not affect the integrity of the randomization (see web Appendix E). 15 
 
responses are roughly balanced across the four demographic groups.
7  
The  randomization  procedure  successfully  generated  two  groups  balanced  along 
observable dimensions.  Specifically, Table 1 lists the mean value in the control group and the 
treatment  minus  control  pre-program  difference  for  a v ariety  of  community  characteristics 
(including total households, distance to nearest road, average respondent years of education, and 
indices for civil war exposure and local history of domestic slavery) as well as an illustrative 
selection of pre-program values for measures that fall under each of the two outcome “families” 
mentioned above.  There are no statistically significant mean differences across the treatment and 
control  groups  in  the  2005  values  of  any  of  these  variables;  Appendix F  contains  the  same 
estimates for all 94 baseline measures and shows that the difference across treatment and control 
groups is significant at 90% confidence for only seven of these, roughly as expected by chance.  
Note that the analysis below controls for baseline values of the outcome under consideration 
where available, addressing any incidental imbalance across groups. One noteworthy pattern in 
the baseline data is the stark gender difference in local meeting involvement, with twice as many 
males (59%) than females (29%) speaking at village meetings. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Measurement 
This analysis draws on three main data sources: household surveys from late 2005 (baseline) and 
mid-2009 (follow-up); village-level focus group discussions held in 2005 and 2009; and three 
novel  structured  community  activities  (SCAs)  conducted  in  late  2009  shortly  after  GoBifo 
activities had ended.  The SCAs were introduced with the initial post-program survey in May 
2009 and then followed up in an unannounced visit five months later.  The research team and 
enumerators were operationally separate from GoBifo staff at all stages of the project. 
The  2005 hous ehold  surveys  collected  data  on  baseline  participation  in  many  local 
collective activities, as well as detailed household demographic and socioeconomic information.  
To establish a panel, the field teams sought out the same respondents during the 2009 follow-up 
household surveys that they had previously interviewed, and the attrition rate was moderate: 
overall, 96% of the same households were located and 76% of the same individual respondents.   
During the data collection visits in 2005 and 2009, the field team supervisor assembled 
                                                 
7 These four demographic groups each comprise roughly a quarter of the adult population in these two districts in the 
2004 Census (ranging from 21 to 31%), indicating that our sample is quite representative. 16 
 
key opinion leaders—including VDC members, the village chief, as well as women and youth 
leaders, among others—to describe the condition of local infrastructure and answer questions 
about  local  collective  processes  and  activities.  Research  supervisors  also  made  their  own 
physical assessments of the quality of construction as a cross-check on focus group responses. 
Given  the  difficulties in gauging  institutional dynamics  and collective  action  through 
survey responses alone, the third main type of data was gathered through the SCAs.  These were 
designed  to  measure  how  communities  respond  to  concrete,  real-world  situations  requiring 
collective action in three different dimensions: (i) raising funds in response to a matching grant 
opportunity; (ii) making a community decision between two comparable alternatives; and (iii) 
allocating  and  managing  an  asset  that  was  provided  for  free.  As  opposed  to  hypothetical 
vignettes or laboratory experiments in the field, these exercises more directly, realistically, and 
less obtrusively capture institutional outcomes of interest.  As we see the development of these 
measures as a key contribution of this paper, we discuss each SCA in detail below. 
SCA  #1 w as  designed  to  measure  whether  GoBifo  produced  persistent  effects  on 
villages’  capacity  for  local  collective  action  beyond  the  life  of  the  project  itself.   E ach 
community received six vouchers they could redeem at a nearby building materials store if they 
raised matching funds.  Specifically, each voucher was worth 50,000 Leones (roughly US$17) 
only if accompanied by another 100,000 Leones (US$33) from the community.  Matching all six 
vouchers generated a sizeable 900,000 Leones, or approximately US$300, for use in the store.  
As the materials could always be resold at value for a profit (given the subsidy), take-up of the 
vouchers was in the community’s self-interest. Yet since individuals had negligible savings and 
faced credit constraints, take-up of the vouchers is a measure of local capacity for cooperation.  
Voucher  redemption  was  recorded  by  clerks  at  the  building  materials  stores.  Enumerators 
returned to all villages five months after the initial distribution of the vouchers to assess the 
distribution of project contributions and benefits (i.e., did they buy zinc to build a new roof for 
the primary school or for the chief’s private compound?), the quality of final construction, and 
how inclusive and transparent the management of the resulting project had been.  In the context 
of the model, higher take up in treatment communities implies that the program reduced the fixed 
costs of collective action, as in this case the marginal component (i.e. the financial subsidies 
offered  through  the  vouchers)  was  exactly  the  same  for  treatment  and  control  villages.    A 
treatment effect here would thereby suggest that GoBifo exerted a persistent effect on public 17 
 
investment by changing the nature of local institutions, norms and collective action capacity. 
SCA #2 was designed to measure the extent to which community decision-making is 
democratic and inclusive, and to assess the level of community participation.  The day before 
survey work, the enumerator teams met with the village head (the lowest level chiefly authority) 
and asked him/her to assemble the entire community for a meeting the next morning.  At the 
subsequent meeting, the enumerators presented the community with a choice between two gifts 
each valued at roughly US$40—a carton of batteries (useful for radios and flashlights) versus 
many small bags of iodized salt—as a token of appreciation for participating in the research.  
The  enumerators  –  who  were  Statistics  Sierra  Leone  employees  and  not  GoBifo  staff  – 
emphasized that the community itself should decide how to share the gift and then withdrew 
from the meeting to observe the decision-making process from the sidelines. The enumerators 
remained “outside” the community meeting circle and recorded how the deliberation evolved 
without making any comments of their own.  Among other things, the enumerators recorded who 
participated  in  any  side-meetings;  the  degree  to  which  the  chief,  village  head  and  elders 
dominated the discussion; the extent of debate in terms of time and the number of comments; and 
a subjective assessment of the apparent influence of different sub-groups (e.g., women) on the 
final outcome.  This exercise thus provides concrete quantitative data on the relative frequency 
of female versus male speakers, and youth versus non-youth speakers in an actual community 
meeting.
8  Note that these are exactly the same metrics that the GoBifo facilitators were required 
to track during project meetings as part of their own internal performance assessment, to monitor 
strides  in  women’s  and  youth  participation,  leadership  and  power  in  treatment  communities 
(GoBifo Project 2008).  Any effects on women and youth’s participation would imply that the 
program’s minority representation requirements exerted a durable impact on behavior through 
learning-by-doing or demonstration effects. 
SCA  #3  was  designed  to  gauge  the  extent  of  elite  capture  of  resources—a  common 
concern for decentralization reforms—as well as the broader nature of collective action.  During 
the first follow-up visit in 2009, the enumerators gave each village a large plastic tarpaulin sheet 
as a gift. Tarpaulins are frequently used in Sierra Leone as makeshift building materials for 
roofing  (40%  of  households  have  potentially  leaky  thatched  roofs),  and  in  agriculture  as  a 
                                                 
8 Of the four enumerators, one focused their data collection on the participation of youths, one on women, one on all 
adults and the fourth kept careful track of each person who spoke publicly.   18 
 
surface  for  drying  grains  (fewer  than  a  quarter  of  villages  have  a  functional  drying  floor).  
During  the  second  2009  follow-up  visit  five  months  later,  enumerators  recorded  which 
households had had access to the tarpaulin in the intervening period. This activity also captures 
an element of collective action, as enumerators assessed whether villages had been able to decide 
on  a  use  for  the  tarp  at  all,  and  whether  it  had  been  put  mainly  towards  a  public  (e.g.,  a 
communal grain drying floor) or private end (patching the roof of an individual’s home). 
 
3.3 The Pre-Analysis Plan and Econometric Specifications 
In what follows, we present results for the specific hypotheses described in our pre-analysis plan, 
a document that was finalized before we analyzed any follow-up data.  The genesis of the plan 
was a pre-program 2005 agreement between the research and project teams that set out the areas 
GoBifo was likely to impact and how success in these areas would be assessed.  Building on this 
early document, we drafted a formal analysis plan that specified the exact outcomes under each 
of eleven hypothesized areas of impact and the econometric specifications to be used, which we 
archived with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab randomized evaluation archive on 
August 21, 2009 (through hypotheses@povertyactionlab.org).  We believe we are among the 
first economics studies to use this approach.
9  Pre-analysis plans limit data mining, specification 
searches,  or  an  ex  post  rationalization  that  selectively  highlights  only  positive  (or  negative) 
effects—or those on specific subgroups—discovered during analysis.  The establishment of a 
public registry could further help mitigate publication bias by expanding the body of evidence 
readily available to researchers and practitioners (Rasmussen et al. 2011).
10 
Towards these ends, the plan has several components.  First, it defined both the sets of 
explanatory and dependent variables  (Leamer 1983) and econometric  models (Leamer 1974) 
before data analysis began.  While the randomized framework naturally imposes much of this 
narrowing (i.e., the treatment indicator is the leading explanatory variable), the plan also details 
the set of interaction terms and population subgroups we would use to explore heterogeneous 
treatment effects.  Second, the large number of outcome variables we consider means that several 
individual treatment effects will be statistically significant due simply to random chance.  To 
                                                 
9 See also Olken et al. (2010), Schaner (2011) and Alatas et al. (forthcoming). Finkelstein et al. 2011 archived a pre-
analysis plan on December 3, 2010.   
10 For an illustration of the problem of specification searching and publication bias in the empirical labor economics 
literature regarding minimum wage impacts, see Card and Krueger (1995). 19 
 
account  for  this,  the  plan  commits  us  to  a m ean  effects  approach  that  reduces  the  effective 
number  of  tests  we  conduct  by  identifying  in  advance  which  outcome  variables  would  be 
grouped together to jointly identify the different hypotheses laid out in the 2005 document (see 
O’Brien 1984; Kling and Liebman 2004; Anderson 2008). While the mean effect index is the 
primary  metric  by  which  we  evaluate  hypotheses,  we  also  provide  results  for  the  outcome 
measures individually to provide a sense of their magnitude and economic significance. Third, 
for full transparency, we disclose the complete results for all 318 unique outcome variables, 
including the exact wording of the survey question, in supplementary web Appendix G. 
There are two minor deviations from the original pre-analysis plan in what we present 
below. We added a twelfth hypothesis (called hypothesis 1 below) by pulling together outcomes 
that had already been explicitly included within the original eleven hypotheses. Thus no new 
outcome  measures  were  added  or  excluded  in  what  we  present  below.  Those  who  wish  to 
consider only the results as exactly laid out ex ante can ignore hypothesis 1. However, we feel it 
was an oversight to exclude a project implementation hypothesis beforehand and thus still find 
the  results  of  hypothesis  1 us eful  to  consider. Perhaps  more  important  is  that  we  group  the 
hypotheses into two “families” for ease of comprehension and to facilitate links to the theory. 
While  we  did  not  specify  these  families  beforehand,  we  believe  that  the  groupings—the 
development “hardware” of project implementation, public goods and economic activity (family 
A), and the “software” of local collective action (family B)—are intuitive. 
Under each hypothesis, we evaluate specific treatment effects using the following model: 
  𝑌 𝑐 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1𝑇 𝑐 + 𝑋′𝑐𝗤 + 𝑊′𝑐𝗱 + 𝜀𝑐          (1)  
where  Yc  is  an  outcome  (i.e.,  local  school  construction)  in  community  c;  Tc  is  the  GoBifo 
treatment indicator; Xc is a vector of the community level controls, including those used to assess 
treatment versus control group balance in the original computer randomizations; Wc is a fixed 
effect for geographic ward, the administrative level on which the randomization was stratified; 
and εc is the usual idiosyncratic error term.  Elements of Xc include distance from road, total 
number  of  households,  an  index  of  violence  experienced  during  the  recent  civil  war  and  a 
measure capturing the historical extent of domestic slavery.  The parameter of interest is β1, the 
average treatment effect.  Note that while some outcomes are measured at the household (e.g., 
radio ownership) or individual level (e.g., political attitudes), the natural unit of analysis is the 20 
 
village  and  we  thus measure  all  variables  at  this level,  taking  village  averages  as  necessary 
(analysis at the household level yields nearly identical results, not shown).
11 
For the subset of outcome variables that were collected in both the baseline 2005 survey 
and in the 2009 follow-up surveys, the analysis exploits the panel data structure: 
𝑌 𝑐𝑡 = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1(𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡) + 𝗽2𝑇𝑐 + 𝗽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑐𝗤 + 𝑊′𝑐𝗱 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡    (12) 
where Yct is a particular outcome for community c at time t, where t = 0 in the 2005 baseline 
survey and t = 1 in the 2009 follow-up.  The additional indicator variable POST denotes the 
follow-up period.  The parameter of interest is again β1, the average treatment effect, and here 
the disturbance terms are clustered at the village level.  Results are robust to the exclusion of the 
vector of community controls and to limiting our analysis to only the post-program data (as 
shown  in  the  sparse  specifications  in  supplementary  web  Appendix  G).    As  set  out  in  our 
analysis  plan,  we  further  assess  the  degree  of  heterogeneous  treatment  effects  by  including 
interaction terms of treatment with respondent gender, age, village remoteness, community size, 
war  exposure,  the  local  history  of  domestic  slavery,  and  location  in  each  of  the  two  study 
districts.  As  we  do not   find  any  evidence  for  heterogeneous  effects  along  any  of  these 
dimensions, we have excluded this discussion from the main text (see supplementary appendix H 
for summary results by outcome family). 
The mean effects index for a hypothesis captures the average relationship between the 
GoBifo treatment and the K different outcome measures grouped in that hypothesis.  Following 
Kling and Liebman (2004), estimation of the index first standardizes outcome variables into 
comparable units by translating each one into standard deviation units (by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard error of the control group) before regressing each outcome on the 
vector of independent variables.   The index coefficient is the mean of these K standardized 
treatment effects.  The estimation method calculates the standard error of the index itself, which 
depends on both the variances of each individual β1,k as well as any covariances between β1,k and 
β1,¬k,  requiring  a  seemingly  unrelated  regressions  (SUR)  system  approach  to  test  the  cross-
equation hypothesis that the average index of K coefficients equals zero.   
 
                                                 
11 Our pre-analysis plan states that we would carry out regressions at each of these three levels of aggregation, and 
since these different levels accommodate different control variables, this leaves an extra degree of freedom that we 
could have eliminated.  Fortunately, the results are consistent across these three different specifications.  If we were 
to create the pre-analysis plan again, however, we would pre-specify analysis at the village level only with the 
accompanying set of village-level controls. 21 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents a concise summary of the mean effect results for all twelve hypotheses, grouped 
into the two outcome families.  The positive and significant (at 99% confidence) mean effect 
estimate of 0.352 standard deviation units for family A (hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) indicates that 
GoBifo  achieved  its  most  immediate  objective  of  providing  the  organizational  and  financial 
means  to  encourage  local  public  goods  construction  and  small  enterprise  development.  
Specifically,  the  coefficient  on  hypothesis  1  indicates  that  the  program  was  well  executed, 
perhaps more so than many other real-world development projects: GoBifo increased measures 
of local organization and linkages to facilitate collective action by 0.687 standard deviations on 
average.  This strong implementation performance in turn led to immediate impacts on local 
infrastructure and other hardware.  The estimated mean effect of 0.164 for hypothesis 2 reflects 
positive effects on the stock and quality of local public goods; while the 0.399 coefficient for 
hypothesis  3 reflects  gains  in general  economic  welfare.   Reflecting  back  on  the  theoretical 
framework, these increases provide strong support for the prediction that the combination of 
lowering the marginal cost of public goods through grants, as well as reducing coordination costs 
through the establishment of new institutions, led to greater public investment during project 
implementation.    The  next  question  is  how  much  of  this  effect  was  driven  by  changes  in 
institutions, norms and collective action capacity. 
The small and not statistically significant mean effect estimate for family B (hypotheses 4 
through 12) suggests that the experience of working together in GoBifo, and the introduction of 
new institutions and processes, did not durably change the nature of local collective action.  The 
program’s democratic decision-making and “help yourself” approach did not appear to spill over 
into other realms of village life nor to persist into the post-program period.  We find no evidence 
that GoBifo led to fundamental changes in local capacity to raise funds and act collectively 
outside of the project, the nature of decision-making, the influence of women or youths, or a 
range of social capital outcomes.  In the context of the model, these null results suggest that 
GoBifo did not permanently increase the benefits of civic engagement for marginalized groups 
and that the organizing  institutions established did not persistently reduce the fixed costs of 
collective action.  In the subsections that follow, we flesh out these results with an illustrative 
sample of outcomes under each family.  Those interested in any particular outcome omitted from 
the  discussion  below  (due  to  space  constraints)  should  refer  to  Appendix  G  for  the  entire 22 
 
inventory of results for all twelve hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Family A: Development Infrastructure or “Hardware” Effects 
The first hypothesis focuses on project implementation and measures the extent to which GoBifo 
successfully established Village Development Committees (VDCs); helped communities draw 
up development plans and open bank accounts; and created links between the villages and their 
local government representatives.  The first two panels of Table 3 present results for several 
outcomes under this hypothesis, where the first seven “full sample” outcomes in Panel A apply 
to all communities within the sample; while the remaining six “conditional” outcomes in Panel B 
are  conditioned  on t he  existence  of  public  infrastructure  and  thus  only  apply  to  those 
communities that have the particular good. All of these treatment effects are greater than zero 
and nine are statistically significant at 95% confidence.   
Regarding interpretation, the treatment effect estimate from the panel specification in the 
first row of Table3 indicates an increase of 34.1 percentage points in the existence of a VDC.  
VDCs already existed in many Sierra Leonean villages when GoBifo was launched, having been 
introduced by humanitarian assistance groups during the war-torn 1990’s (Richards et al. 2004). 
By the post-program period, 86.3% of GoBifo communities had a VDC compared to 45.8% of 
controls, a large effect.  The corresponding coefficient in the second row indicates that GoBifo 
increased the likelihood that a community was visited by a member of its Ward Development 
Committee in the past year by 15.6 percentage points.  Row 3 shows a positive treatment effect 
on the existence of village development plans by 29.6 percentage points, nearly a 50% increase 
on the base of 61.7% in the controls.  Row 4 reveals an increase in having a village bank account 
of 70.6 percentage points, capturing a tenfold increase. In Panel B, the household survey asked 
respondents whether a member of the Ward Development Committee or district council was 
“directly  involved  in  the  planning,  construction,  maintenance  or  oversight”  of  several  local 
public goods. Note that the treatment effect is positive and significant for nearly all outcomes.  
This  suggests  that  GoBifo  successfully  led  local  politicians  to  increase  their  involvement  in 
village projects, consistent with its objective of supporting the broader decentralization process.   
Moving from project implementation to impacts on development hardware, hypothesis 2 
explores treatment effects on the quantity and quality of local public goods. While combining 
measures within a single hypothesis into sub-indices was not specified in our pre-analysis plan, 23 
 
the  outcomes  under  hypothesis  2  naturally  form  three  sub-groups:  the  stock  of  local  public 
goods, the quality of such goods, and community financial contributions to their construction and 
upkeep.  Regarding the stock, the first five rows of Panel C in Table 3 present impacts for an 
illustrative sample of goods.  Note that four of these treatment effects are positive and three are 
statistically significant.  Specifically, there are marked increases in the proportion of villages 
with a functional traditional midwife post by 17.5 percentage points, community center by 24.1, 
and  latrine  by  21.0.   Calculating  a m ean  index  on  the  entire  sub-group  reveals  a  highly 
significant increase of 0.258 standard deviations (s.e. 0.049, not shown).
12 
Turning to the next sub-group, the first three rows of Panel D show positive GoBifo 
impacts on the quality  of construction of three of the most common public goods—primary 
schools, latrines and grain drying floors—where quality was determined through direct physical 
assessment. The effects are all positive as is the quality sub-group index overall, which shows an 
increase of 0.296 standard deviation units (s.e. 0.077).
13 These measures combine impacts from 
the  GoBifo  funded  infrastructure  projects,  as  well  as  any  potential  effects  from  better  local 
collective action in maintaining existing infrastructure. However, as there is no evidence that 
management practices did in fact change in treatment villages, the leading interpretation is that 
the positive impacts are being driven by the grants.  
The  last  three  rows  of  Panel  D  present  illustrative  results  for  the  final  sub-group  of 
outcomes  that  concern  community  financial  contributions  to  existing  infrastructure.    Two  of 
these are negative and one is statistically significant.  Looking across nine different local public 
goods,  the  sub-group  index  is  negative  (at  -0.113  standard  deviations)  but  not  statistically 
significant  (s.e.  0.104).   C ombined  with  the  negative  and  marginally  significant  effect  on 
whether the community approached another NGO or donor for financial support (in row 15 of 
Table 3), these provide suggestive evidence that GoBifo funds served as a substitute, rather than 
a complement, for the community’s own resources.  At a minimum, they indicate that the GoBifo 
grants  did  not  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  additional  fund-raising  nor  did  project  experiences 
encourage participants to seek out further development assistance.  The SCA findings (discussed 
in Section 4.2 below) reinforce this finding. 
Hypothesis 3 relates to at general economic welfare, since roughly one sixth of the grants 
                                                 
12 The mean effect index for the sub-group includes impacts on six additional goods not presented due to space 
constraints: water wells, peripheral health unit, market, grain store, sports field and sports uniforms. 
13 The quality of construction sub-group index uses two measures for each good and includes effects on water wells. 24 
 
were used to launch projects dedicated to job skills training or small business development—
such as carpentry, soap-making and seed multiplication initiatives—that, if well implemented, 
could translate into higher small business profits, and perhaps lead to sustainably higher future 
earnings.  Moreover, GoBifo injected cash grants into very poor communities, and as with any 
assistance, a portion of the funds are surely fungible.  Via potentially all of these mechanisms, 
this  third  hypothesis  considers  project  impacts  on m easures  of  community-wide  economic 
activity and household welfare. 
The first two outcomes in Panel E of Table 3 refer to village-level outcomes, where we 
see a 30% increase in the number of petty traders (0.7 more traders on a base of 2.4 traders in the 
control group) and a 13% increase in goods locally available for sale.  The last four outcomes are 
aggregated from household survey reports. We observe improvements in an asset ownership 
score  (derived  using  principal  components  analysis),  where  the  underlying  assets  include 
common household durables (e.g., radios, mobile phones), amenities like drinking water source 
and sanitation, and the materials used in the roof, walls and floor of the dwelling.  The project 
tripled the proportion of respondents who had recently participated in skills training: an 11.9 
percentage point increase on a base of 6.1% in control communities.  We find no impact on total 
household income in 2009, however, this is difficult to measure among households engaged in 
subsistence agriculture and the treatment effect estimate is relatively imprecise.  
 
4.2 Family B: Impacts on “Software”: Local Institutions and Norms for Collective Action 
The positive treatment effects for outcome family A suggest that investment in local public 
goods did increase substantially during the project as predicted by the theoretical model.  To 
determine the role played by more effective local institutions (versus the block grants), we next 
examine post-program outcomes after the block grants had been spent.  The first hypothesis 
under  the  software  family  (hypothesis  4)  covers  outcomes  relating  to  collective  action  and 
contributions  to  local  public  goods.    The  mean  effect  for  this  hypothesis  is  not  statistically 
distinguishable from zero (0.041 standard deviations with a standard error of 0.042); and of the 
59 full sample and conditional outcomes evaluated, only seven treatment effects are significant at 
95% confidence, with five positive in sign and two negative.  The subset of outcomes relating to 
the matching grant opportunity (SCA #1) provides the most succinct and concrete illustration of 
the lack of program impacts in this area.  The top panel of Table 4 shows that there was no 25 
 
differential take-up of the subsidized building vouchers: 62 treatment (52.5%) and 64 control 
villages (54.2%) redeemed vouchers at local supply stores; nor is there any difference in the 
number of vouchers redeemed, as most of the villages that cashed in any vouchers used all six.  
The ability to mobilize around a new opportunity and raise funds for it is close to the essence of 
local collective action. This finding implies that the program did not have durable effects on 
collective action capacity.  
Other outcomes under this hypothesis consider household contributions to existing local 
public goods, where we expand the set of contributions to include labor, local materials, or food 
for project workers, yet continue to find no treatment effect.  There are also no differences in 
contributions to several local self-help groups (i.e., rotating savings groups and labor gangs) nor 
in financial support for community teachers.  Lastly, while treatment villages were more likely to 
have  a  communal  farm,  by  23 pe rcentage  points  (significant  at  99%  confidence),  the  total 
number of respondents in treatment areas who had worked on a communal farm in the past year 
was no higher.  This presents a telling example of how project-funded activities—for example, 
the subsidized provision of seeds and tools for a community farm—exerted a proximate effect on 
the establishment of a local organization established to capture that funding, but did not have any 
lasting impacts on actual communal cultivation in subsequent years. 
These  findings raise  troubling questions  about GoBifo’s long term impacts.  Clearly, 
community members  gained experience in  working together to successfully implement local 
development  projects  over  the  nearly  four  years  of  the  project.   Y et  their  GoBifo-specific 
experiences did not lead to greater capacity to take advantage of new opportunities that arose 
after the program ended.  Most strikingly, while GoBifo often created new structures designed to 
facilitate local development by reducing organizational costs—the VDC, a development plan, a 
bank account, and a communal farm—these structures left them no better able to take advantage 
of the realistic matching grant opportunity in SCA #1.  
The second “software” hypothesis includes outcomes relating to the civic involvement of 
socially marginalized groups.  Since the inclusion of women and youth held great prominence in 
GoBifo’s objectives and facilitator operating manuals, it also received special attention in the 
data  collection.  Covering  an  exhaustive  battery  of  measures,  the  mean  effect  is  a p recisely 
estimated zero (see hypothesis 5 in Table 2) indicating no overall impact on the role of women or 
youth in local decision-making, or on the transparency and accountability of decision-making 26 
 
more generally.  Of the 72 distinct outcomes considered, only six were statistically significant at 
95% confidence, dividing equally between positive and negative treatment effects. 
Enumerator  observations  during  SCA  #2,  when  villages  met  to  decide  between  salt 
versus batteries, provide a clear illustration of this zero result.  In Panel B of Table 4 there are no 
treatment effects on the total number of adults, women and youths who attended the meeting or 
spoke  publicly  during  the  deliberation.  To  illustrate:  on a verage,  25  women  attended  these 
meetings but just two of them made a public statement during the discussion about which item to 
choose. The difference between the number of women who spoke in treatment versus control 
communities is only -0.19 (s.e. 0.22), and the proportion of males who spoke during the meeting 
remained twice as high as the proportion of females in the treatment villages, the same as at 
baseline. We similarly find no impact on whether any smaller “elite” groups broke off from the 
general  meeting  to  make  the  gift  choice  without  broader  consultation;  the  duration  of  the 
deliberation;  or  how  democratic  the  decision-process  appeared  to  the  enumerators  (e.g.,  by 
holding a direct vote).  These results are further substantiated by respondent reports recorded 
immediately after the meeting of how the tarpaulin allocation choice in SCA #3 was made, 
including which individuals had the final “say” and to what extent the decision was dominated 
by local elites (i.e., village headmen and male elders).  Moreover, respondent opinions collected 
during the second 2009 follow-up survey (five months later) also find no treatment effects on 
reports about how decisions were made to distribute the salt or batteries (SCA #2); how to use 
the tarp (SCA #3); whether to raise funds for the building materials vouchers, and if so, how to 
mobilize funds, which items to purchase, and how to manage any construction (SCA #1).   
Despite all of the effort in GoBifo to elevate the position of women and youth, we thus do 
not observe any improvement in their role relative to older men in community decision making. 
Even for relatively low cost actions like speaking up in meetings, the nearly four years of GoBifo 
project activities did not translate into greater apparent voice for marginalized groups.  In the 
context of the theory, this suggests no persistent gains in the individual benefits of participation 
for  these  groups,  and  provides  additional  evidence  that  the  increase  in  public  investment 
observed during project implementation was likely driven by the financial subsidy rather than 
fundamental changes in local institutions or de facto power.
14 
                                                 
14 However, we cannot rule out that the subsidy was particularly effective (i.e., led to such notable increases in 
public goods) in part because of the project’s facilitation and emphasis on participation and transparency. 27 
 
The third software hypothesis (which was included in the pre-analysis plan but was not 
an official aim of GoBifo project management) asks whether by espousing more democratic 
ways of managing local development, the project led to changes in the role of the traditional 
chiefly authorities. Taking all outcomes together, the mean effect for hypothesis 6 is also zero 
(Table 2).  Many outcomes under this hypothesis estimate the extent to which the village head 
and elders dominated the SCA decisions.  While we find variation in how these decisions are 
made—at one extreme, in two villages the Chief decided between the salt and batteries in less 
than one minute without anyone else’s input, while at the other an open discussion lasted nearly 
an  hour  and  was  followed  by  a  formal  vote—as  mentioned  above,  we  find  no  systematic 
differences across treatment and control villages.   
A leading explanation for the lack of institutional change, with some support in the data, 
is  that  elites  exerted  substantial  control  over  the  new  organizations  GoBifo  created.   A s  an 
example, traditional elites retained their leadership of the VDC: in both treatment and control 
villages (for the roughly half of control communities with a VDC in 2009), 88% of VDC chairs 
are men, 87% are older than 35, and 52% are traditional chiefdom authorities and elders.  While 
participation requirements translated into some gains for women (a 6.6 percentage point increase 
in the proportion female members and a near doubling of the proportion of female Treasurers 
(57% versus 31%)), the representation of youths remained at the same low level as in control 
areas (at 26%).  These patterns highlight a tension inherent in the CDD approach: leveraging the 
capacity of existing institutions may be expedient for immediate project implementation while 
simultaneously limiting the likelihood of fundamental institutional transformation or changes in 
de facto power for marginalized groups. 
We therefore tested the related hypothesis that CDD may enable local elites to capture a 
disproportionate share of economic benefits.  We explored this issue directly by distributing a 
new public asset—the tarp (SCA #3)—in villages during the first 2009 follow-up visit, and then 
observing how it was being used in the unannounced second visit five months later.  While the 
analysis finds no treatment effects on the extent of elite capture, it also reveals that the level of 
elite capture is, perhaps surprisingly, relatively low in the study communities.  Panel C of Table 
4 shows that for the 90% of communities that had used the tarp by the time of the second visit, 
86% had put the tarp towards a public purpose, such as a communal rice drying floor or local 
ceremony.  The most obvious example of elite capture would be use of the tarp to patch the roof 28 
 
of a single individual’s house, which happened in fewer than 3% of all villages.  That said, 
several communities had not yet used the tarp and were storing it at a private residence, which 
either suggests a failure to agree on the appropriate way forward, or signals the risk of future 
elite capture, or both. 
The next three hypotheses explore proxies for “social capital”—self-expressed trust of 
others (hypothesis 7), involvement in local groups and networks (hypothesis 8), and access to 
information (hypothesis 9)—emphasized alongside collective action and inclusion in the official 
GoBifo project objectives (World Bank 2004, GoBifo 2007).  Despite exploring a wealth of 
measures, the analysis reveals no treatment effects on social capital and the three mean effects 
indices are all indistinguishable from zero.  Beginning with trust, the only significant effect is an 
increase in reported trust of NGOs and donor projects: residents in treatment communities were 
5.4 percentage points more likely to agree that NGOs or donors “can be believed” (close to the 
Krio translation for trust) as opposed to you “have to be careful” in dealing with them.  There are 
no effects on the remaining eleven indicators, which combine respondent self-reports regarding 
how  much  they  trust  various  groups  with  concrete  examples  of  trusting  behavior,  such  as 
entrusting money to a neighbor to purchase market goods on your behalf.  
Second, enumerators asked respondents whether they were a member of a local self-help 
group (such as a credit/savings group, communal labor gang, school committee, funeral savings 
group, fishing cooperative, women’s group or youth group, among others) and if so, whether 
they had attended a meeting and contributed financially or in labor in the past month (hypothesis 
8).  We find no significant treatment effects on these indicators nor on other measures of local 
cooperation, such as whether the respondent had helped a neighbor re-thatch the roof of their 
house, a time-intensive activity that one cannot easily do alone. 
There is also no evidence of treatment effects on households’ access to information about 
local government or governance (hypothesis 9).  Among 21 outcomes, only one—the proportion 
of villages visited by a WDC member, discussed above—shows statistically significant effects.  
The collection of zero effects includes measures of how much respondents know about what the 
community is doing with the building vouchers (SCA #1) and tarp (SCA #3); whether they can 
name their district council and chiefdom leaders; and their ability to answer objective questions 
about how local taxes are collected and used. 
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10) is positive and statistically significant, it is largely driven by the outcomes already discussed 
under family A.  Specifically, we find large impacts on the existence of VDCs and village plans, 
and increases in the oversight of local public goods by chiefdom authorities that mirror earlier 
results on the involvement of local government representatives.  There is no systematic evidence, 
however, that these stronger links with either set of local officials translated into more active 
individual  political  engagement,  such  as  self-reported  voting  or  running  for  local  office.  
Similarly, treatment communities were no more likely to use the building materials and tarp in 
the SCAs for goals specified in their village development plan.  Reinforcing earlier results, this 
disconnect between the articulation of a development plan and its real-world application suggests 
that few communities applied GoBifo project tools to initiatives beyond the program.   
There are no impacts on crime and conflict in treatment villages or in the mechanisms 
through which they are resolved, leading to a zero mean effect for hypothesis 11 (Table 2).  Of 
the ten indicators considered, only one—the 2 percentage point reduction in household reports of 
physical fighting over the past year—is significant at 95% confidence.  While the nine null 
results imply that project efforts to enhance conflict management capacity may not have created 
lingering benefits, on the positive side it provides some reassurance that the infusion of block 
grants into the treatment communities at least did not spark increased conflict. 
The twelfth and final hypothesis concerns the nature of individual political and social 
attitudes.  The GoBifo program’s emphasis on the empowerment of women and youth, and the 
transparency  of  local  institutions,  may  have  engendered  a  more  equitable  or  “progressive” 
outlook toward politics  and society more  generally.   Even if there  are no changes in  actual 
decision-making  processes  or  local  collective  outcomes  (as  above),  a m arked  change  in 
expressed attitudes might still mean that the seeds for future social change had been planted. 
Enumerators  gauged  attitudes  using  pairs  of  opposing  statements,  such  as  “As  citizens,  we 
should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders” versus “In our country these days, 
we should have more respect for authority,” and asking respondents which they agreed with 
more.  These paired statements capture respondent views on a diverse range of topics including 
the acceptability of the use of violence in politics (a particularly salient issue in post-war Sierra 
Leone), domestic violence, youth and women in leadership roles, paying bribes, and coerced 
labor.  Once  again,  there  are  no  significant  program  effects,  despite  the  concern  that  social 
desirability bias might lead some respondents to express views promoted by the program. The 30 
 
only  significant  impact  is  a  positive  3.8 pe rcentage  point  increase  in  agreement  with  the 
statement that young people can be good leaders. However, recall that this change in opinions 
did not translate into more youths holding actual leadership positions on the VDC, or to more 
youth participation in the SCA meetings. Attitudinal change may be a necessary step toward 
changing future behavior, but almost four years of an intensive community driven development 
program did not lead to detectable changes in a wide array of expressed attitudes. 
 
4.3 Robustness and Validity Checks 
This  section  evaluates  the  robustness  of  the  results.  To  start,  we  consider  typical  threats  to 
randomized experiments.  Fortunately, there were no problems with treatment non-compliance: 
all communities assigned to the treatment group received the program and none of those in the 
control group participated; and respondent attrition rates are no different in treatment and control 
areas.  The baseline statistics presented in Table 1 and supplementary Appendix F also suggest 
that  the  randomization process  successfully  created  two  groups  of  villages  that  were  similar 
along a wide range of observables.  Note further that the analyses use the baseline value of the 
outcome of interest as a control variable wherever such panel data is available.  Thus in order for 
spurious differences between the two groups to explain the positive impacts, the treatment group 
would on average have had to be on a different trajectory than the controls, but there is no reason 
to believe this should systematically be the case given the randomized research design. 
We next consider reasons why the treatment effect estimates might be underestimates.  
First, significant program spillovers from treatment to control communities could  lead  us  to 
underestimate program impacts, since the control communities would also be receiving program 
benefits, albeit indirectly. For this to be true, we might expect the coefficient on the POSTt 
indicator (in equation 12) to often be positive and significant, but this is not the case: across all 
the  outcomes  in  Appendix  G  where  panel  data  is  available,  there  are  exactly  as  many  (21) 
positive as negative coefficient estimates on POSTt  that are statistically significant, and thus it 
seems unlikely that the results are biased by spillovers across communities. 
A further concern is that the projects GoBifo simultaneously implemented at the ward 
level systematically benefited the control group at the expense of the treatment group.  There was 
a separate pot of funding for each ward that was allocated by the Ward Development Committee 
(see footnote 2). Bias could result if WDC members took into account the placement of GoBifo 31 
 
village-level projects in deciding where to locate the ward projects and targeted those areas that 
had not already benefited, perhaps as a way of compensating them for losing out on village-level 
assistance.  However, there are no meaningful differences in the targeting of ward-level projects 
across treatment and control villages, and, if anything, treatment villages are slightly more likely 
to benefit: while 15.2% of respondents in treatment areas reported that a household member 
benefited from a ward-level project, only 6.1% of respondents in control areas reported benefits.  
A final concern is that the outcome measures were simply insufficiently refined to detect 
subtle  decision-making,  institutional,  political  or  social  differences  between  treatment  and 
control communities.  While some of our measures are certainly better than others, our main 
strength lies in the diversity and multiplicity of measures  we use and the fact that they  all 
produce  similar  results.    We  combine  different  data  collection  approaches,  for  example, 
employing both survey self-reports on the percentage of female and male respondents who spoke 
during the SCA meetings with direct enumerator observation of how many men and women they 
saw speaking during the meeting.  The research teams also gathered information from a variety 
of sources: they interviewed men and women in their own homes, held focus group discussions 
with key opinion leaders, observed a community decision as it unfolded, and recorded their own 
independent assessment of the construction quality of local infrastructure.  Lastly, we examine a 
large number of outcomes.  Taking all these data together, the “zero” GoBifo program effects 
are quite precisely estimated.  To illustrate, the maximum true positive treatment effect on the 
proportion of women speaking (in the salt versus battery SCA #2 deliberation) that we may have 
incorrectly ruled out at 95% confidence is one additional female speaker per every 4.3 villages 
we visited, which is quite small. In the mean effects analysis, which combines many outcome 
measures, confidence intervals are considerably tighter. 
 
4.4 Alternative Interpretations and the Perils of Data Mining 
Section  4.2  shows  that  evaluating  the  institutional  change  outcomes  jointly  under  their  pre-
specified hypotheses generates no evidence for program impacts under family B.  Yet without 
the discipline of the pre-analysis plan and mean effects approach, we could have instead selected 
an assortment of individual treatment effects from amongst our 146 variables to tell basically 
any story we liked about the impact of external aid on institutions.  While such data mining 
poses  a  risk  for  any  analysis,  it is   particularly  problematic  for  measuring  institutions.   T he 32 
 
multidimensionality  of  institutions—governing  political,  economic  and  social  behaviors—
implies a large number of outcomes, some of which will be statistically significant by pure 
chance.  Moreover, because institutions are amorphous and contextually determined, there is no 
commonly agreed set of standard measures defining the core of each domain. (By contrast, any 
study regarding the returns to education would by necessity focus on individual wages.)  The 
combination  of  these  two  characteristics  allows  great  flexibility  in  determining  which 
institutional outcomes to measure and report, possibly tempting the researcher to “cherry-pick” a 
novel  set  of  treatment  effects  whose  selectively  is  difficult  to  detect  from  the  outside.    To 
underscore just how misleading such data mining can be, Table 5 uses our data to construct two 
alternative interpretations—one negative, one positive—about GoBifo’s impacts on institutions. 
The  selective  collection  of  individual  treatment  effects  in  the  first  panel  of  Table  5 
suggests  that  the  heavy  emphasis  placed  on  participation  during  GoBifo  implementation 
activities created “meeting fatigue” within treatment villages, which eventually translated into 
poor management of local development projects and political apathy.  Specifically, respondents 
were less likely to report that they had attended a meeting to decide what to do with the tarp after 
the research teams had left the village.  Tracing this initial backlash against participation through 
the course of the tarp SCA, we see that villagers were less likely to: report that “everyone had 
equal say” in deciding how to use the tarp; know what the tarp was being used for; actually put 
the  tarp  to  use;  or  be  able  to  produce  the  tarp  for  inspection  by  the  survey  team.   T his 
deterioration in community participation appears to have further manifested in declining civic 
engagement more broadly, as evidence by decreased interest in holding local office (as a  VDC 
member) and lower turnout in the recent local government elections. 
The second panel of Table 5 presents quite the opposite story: these treatment effects 
suggest  that  the  positive  experiences  communities  gained  implementing  GoBifo  projects 
catalyzed other collective activities and encouraged villagers to incorporate the new democratic 
practices into other realms of decision making.  These shifts in collective norms and behaviors in 
turn created space for new leaders in the community and incited greater interest in politics more 
generally.  More specifically, individual outcomes in Panel B reveal gains in non-project specific 
collective action, like increased training for community teachers and a greater prevalence of 
women’s  groups.   B road  adoption  of  the  democratic  norms  introduced  by  the  project  is 
evidenced by increased minute taking at community meetings, a greater likelihood of storing 33 
 
building materials in a public place, and local chiefs playing a less dominant role in managing 
the tarp.  Finally, the CDD experience instilled a more accepting attitude towards youths taking 
on leadership roles, and increased citizen awareness of national politics, as seen by the greater 
ability to correctly name the Section Chief and the date of the next general election. 
These two plausible, completely opposite, and equally erroneous interpretations highlight 
the fallacy of choosing the set of outcomes to present ex post based on statistical significance 
alone.  Our pre-analysis plan eliminated this possibility by specifying in advance the complete 
set of outcomes and how the individual treatment effects would be aggregated to evaluate the 
overall success of the intervention. Thus the statistically significant impacts scattered throughout 
family B do not contradict the estimation of a zero overall treatment effect on institutions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a well-implemented program that sought to provide 
public  goods  and  change  institutions  by  establishing  organizational  structures  to  streamline 
collective  action  and  imposing  participation  requirements  to  enhance  the  influence  of 
marginalized groups in Sierra Leone.  Our evidence suggests that the intervention was successful 
in setting up new village structures, improving the stock of local public goods and enhancing 
economic welfare, but did not lead to any lasting changes in village institutions, local collective 
action capacity, social norms and attitudes, or the nature of de facto political power.  
The results contradict the currently popular notion in foreign aid circles that community 
driven development (CDD) is an effective method to sustainably catalyze collective action or 
fundamentally alter local decision-making processes.  The establishment of local committees, 
development  plans  and  bank  accounts  did  not  lead  to  permanent  reductions  in  the  fixed 
organizing costs of collective action, likely because communities did not adopt and apply the 
new  structures  and  tools  to  communal  endeavors  beyond  the  immediate  project  sphere.  
Exposure to democratic project processes similarly did not make traditional elites more willing 
to seek out the views of others in making community decisions, nor were villages any better able 
to raise funds in response to a matching grant opportunity.  While “good” institutions may be 
critical for successful economic development, our findings provide another piece of evidence 
that institutions and social norms are difficult to change.  At the same time our results challenge 
the aid pessimist’s view that external assistance cannot improve the lives of the poor in countries 34 
 
with weak institutions.  While we should not be so naïve as to think that structural factors like 
social organization and institutions are easily transformed (Easterly 2006, Kremer and Miguel 
2007), we find that well allocated external aid can have a positive impact on welfare.  Indeed our 
results suggest that the comparative advantage of the World Bank and other donors may lie more 
in providing development “hardware,” and less in instigating large-scale institutional and social 
change, at least not using current tools such as CDD.   
Our  results  further  suggest  that  participation  requirements  did  not  foster  learning-by-
doing or demonstration effects large enough to change attitudes, norms or behaviors towards 
marginalized groups taking on leadership roles in this context.  Despite project requirements on 
the  inclusion  of  women  and  youth  in  project  related  decision  making,  intensive  facilitation 
designed  to  build  these  groups  capacity  to  engage,  and  the  experience  of  being  in  decision 
making roles throughout the project, nearly four years later we see that women and youths are no 
more  likely  to  voice  opinions  about  how  the  community  should  manage  new  public  assets.  
Returning to the comparison between informal interventions focused on reshaping norms, like 
the program studied here, and changes to the rules of formal institutions, like female leadership 
quotas, the limited existing evidence suggests that the latter may be a more effective way to alter 
de facto power dynamics and social perceptions in a modest timeframe (Chattopadhyay  and 
Duflo  2004;  Beaman  et  al.  2009).    Importantly,  however,  we  cannot  rule  out  that  part  of 
GoBifo’s  success  in  using  grants  to  deliver  hardware  impacts  was  due  to  its  emphasis  on 
transparency and the inclusion of marginalized groups.  
Turning to empirical methods, our research underscores the importance of registering a 
pre-analysis plan to prevent data mining and to generate appropriately sized statistical tests.  In 
the absence of a pre-analysis plan, we show how misleading an undisciplined interpretation of 
the  individual  treatment  effects  can  be  by  presenting  two  opposing  and  equally  erroneous 
narratives based on our actual data.  In addition, our structured community activities (SCAs) 
provide  an  example  of  participatory  and  contextually  specific  tools  to  measure  institutional 
behaviors  that  are  at  the  same  time  concrete  and  standardized.  As  opposed  to  relying  on 
subjective survey data, lab experiments or hypothetical vignettes alone, we feel that using this 
kind of objective and realistic measures lends confidence to our results. 
As our results concern one program in one country, our more general policy implications 
are  clearly  speculative.  However,  we  can  conclude  with  certainty  that  far  more  research  is 35 
 
needed to identify the precise reforms and external interventions that can successfully reshape 
institutions to enhance collective action capacity while promoting accountability and inclusion. 
This  study  further  emphasizes  the  importance  of  registering  a  pre-analysis  plan  and  using 
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Total households per community 46.76 0.30 236
(3.67)
Distance to nearest motorable road in miles 2.99 -0.32 236
(0.36)
Index of war exposure (range 0 to 1) 0.68 -0.01 236
(0.02)
Historical legacy of domestic slavery (range 0 to 1) 0.36 0.03 236
(0.06)
Average respondent years of education 1.65 0.11 235
(0.13)
Proportion of communities with a Village development committee (VDC) 0.55 0.06 232
(0.06)
Proportion visited by Ward Development Committee (WDC) member in past yea 0.15 -0.01 228
(0.05)
Proportion of communities with a functional grain drying floor 0.23 0.05 231
(0.05)
Proportion of communities with a functional primary school 0.41 0.08 230
(0.06)
Average household asset score -0.06 0.11 235
(0.08)
Proportion of communities with any petty traders 0.54 -0.01 226
(0.06)
Respondent agrees that chiefdom officials can be trusted 0.66 -0.01 235
(0.02)
Respondent agrees that Local Councillors can be trusted 0.61 0.00 235
(0.02)
Respondent is a member of credit / savings group 0.25 -0.03 235
(0.02)
Among males who attended a community meeting, respondent spoke publicly 0.59 -0.02 235
(0.04)
Among females who attended a community meeting, respondent spoke publicly 0.29 0.03 229
(0.04)
Respondent claimed to have voted in last local elections 0.85 -0.01 235
(0.02)
Table 1: Baseline (2005) Comparison between Treatment and Control Communities
Notes on table: i) significance levels indicated by + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01; ii) robust standard errors;
iii) the T-C difference is the pre-program "treatment effect" run on the baseline data aggregated to the village-
level mean, using a minimal specification that includes only fixed effects for the district council wards (the unit
of stratification) and the two balancing variables from the randomization (total households and distance to road);
iv) regressions for the two balancing variables in rows 1 and 2 exclude the outcome from the set of controls; and
v) see Appendix F for the T-C difference for all 94 outcomes collected in the baseline survey.
Panel A: Community Characteristics
Panel B: Selected Outcomes from "Hardware" Family A
Panel C: Selected Outcomes from "Software" Family BHypotheses by family GoBifo 
Mean 
Effect     
(std. error)
Mean Effect for Family A (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3; 37 total outcomes) 0.352**
(0.030)
H1: GoBifo creates functional development committees (7 outcomes) 0.687**
(0.062)
H2: GoBifo increases the quality and quantity of local public services infrastructure (16 outcomes) 0.164**
(0.040)
H3: GoBifo improves general economic welfare (14 outcomes) 0.399**
(0.047)
Mean Effect for Family B (Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12; 146 total outcomes) 0.029
(0.019)
H4: GoBifo increases collective action and contributions to local public goods (15 outcomes) 0.041
(0.042)
H5: GoBifo enhances inclusion and participation in community decisions, especially for vulnerable 
groups (43 outcomes) 0.001
(0.031)
H6: GoBifo changes local systems of authority (25 outcomes) 0.048
(0.036)
H7: GoBifo enhances trust (11 outcomes) 0.042
(0.064)
H8: GoBifo builds groups and networks (12 outcomes) 0.033
(0.044)
H9: GoBifo increases access to information about local governance (19 outcomes) 0.003
(0.039)
H10: GoBifo increases participation in local governance (15 outcomes) 0.114**
(0.047)
H11: GoBifo reduces crime and conflict (8 outcomes) 0.028
(0.054)
H12: GoBifo fosters more liberal political and social attitudes (9 outcomes) 0.034
(0.041)
Notes on table: i) significance levels indicated by + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01; ii) robust standard errors
clustered by village for panel data; iii) includes fixed effects for the district council wards (the unit of
stratification) and the following control variables: total households per community, distance to nearest
motorable road, index of war exposure, and index of history of domestic slavery; iv) these mean effect estimates
are limited to the full sample set of outcomes that excludes all conditional outcomes (i.e. those that depend on
the state of another variable--for example, quality of infrastructure depends on the existence of the
infrastructure); and v) for the complete list of all full sample and conditional variables under each hypothesis--
including the exact wording of survey questions and treatment effect estimates for each distinct outcome
measure--see Appendix G.
Table 2: GoBifo Treatment Effects by Research Hypothesis
Family A: Development Infrastructure or "Hardware" Effects







(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.458 0.341** (0.077) 467
0.212 0.156* (0.070) 462
0.617 0.296** (0.048) 221
0.081 0.706** (0.045) 226
Primary School 0.415 0.181** (0.055) 138
Grain drying floor 0.243 0.140* (0.061) 115
Latrine 0.219 0.155** (0.040) 169
Traditional midwife post 0.399 0.002 (0.106) 70
Community center 0.251 0.244** (0.053) 95
0.462 -0.007 (0.050) 464
0.237 0.104 (0.066) 459
0.079 0.175** (0.035) 235
0.462 0.210** (0.059) 234
0.212 0.241** (0.063) 469
0.292 -0.156+ (0.081) 460
Primary School 0.583 0.116* (0.055) 123
Grain drying floor 0.375 0.142+ (0.076) 101
Latrine 0.270 0.177** (0.055) 154
Primary School 0.554 -0.007 (0.112) 242
Grain drying floor 0.105 0.086 (0.124) 184
Latrine 0.761 -0.197* (0.093) 126
2.432 0.719* (0.344) 225
4.449 0.560* (0.240) 236
-0.170 0.212* (0.090) 471
0.061 0.119** (0.018) 235
746.94 -21.773 (73.069) 236
Table 3: Family A: Illustrative Treatment Effects 
Income from top 3 cash earning sources (in 1,000 Leones)
Attended trade skills training
Total petty traders in village
Total goods on sale of 10
Household asset score
Panel C: Hypothesis 3 - Economic Welfare
Functional grain drying floor in the community
Functional traditional midwife post in the community
Functional latrine in the community
Functional community center in the community
Supervisor's physical assessment of construction quality (index from 0 to 1):
Notes on table: i) significance levels indicated by + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01; ii) treatment effects are
estimated on panel data where available; iii) robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village for panel
specifications; iv) includes fixed effects for the district council wards (the unit of stratification) and the following 
control variables: total households per community, distance to nearest motorable road, index of war exposure,
and index of history of domestic slavery; and v) where indicated, outcomes are conditional on the existence of
functional infrastructure in the community
Outcome variable
Village development committee
Visit by WDC member
Village development plan
Community bank account
Panel A: Hypothesis 1 - Project Implementation
Panel B: Hypothesis 2 - Local Public Goods
Community took a proposal to an NGO or donor for funding
A local politician was involved in managing the infrastructure:
Functional primary school in the community







GoBifo Mean Effect for SCA #1 (13 outcomes in total) 0.00 -0.06 (0.05)
Proportion of communities that redeemed vouchers at building materials store 0.54 -0.01 (0.06)
Average number of vouchers redeemed at the store (out of six) 2.95 0.11 (0.35)
Proportion of communities that held a meeting to discuss the vouchers 0.98 -0.05* (0.02)
GoBifo Mean Effect for SCA #2 (32 outcomes in total) 0.00 0.01 (0.04)
Duration of gift choice deliberation (in minutes) 9.36 1.60 (1.13)
Total adults in attendance at gift choice meeting 54.51 3.50 (3.20)
Total women in attendance at gift choice meeting 24.99 1.99 (1.68)
Total youths (approximately 18-35 years) in attendance at gift choice meeting 23.57 2.10 (1.38)
Total number of public speakers during the deliberation 6.04 0.24 (0.40)
Total number of women who spoke publicly during the deliberation 1.88 -0.19 (0.22)
Total number of youths (approximately 18-35 years) who spoke publicly 2.14 0.23 (0.24)
Proportion of communities that held a vote during the deliberation 0.10 0.07 (0.04)
GoBifo Mean Effect for SCA #3 (18 outcomes in total) 0.00 -0.03 (0.05)
Proportion of communities that held a meeting to discuss use of the tarp 0.98 -0.03 (0.02)
Proportion of communities that stored the tarp in a public place 0.06 0.06 (0.04)
Proportion of communities that had used the tarp (5 months after receipt) 0.90 -0.08+ (0.04)
Given tarp used, proportion of communities using the tarp in a public way 0.86 0.02 (0.05)
Notes on table: i) significance levels denoted by + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 and ** p < 0.01; ii) robust standard errors;
iii) treatment effects estimated on follow-up data; (iv) includes fixed effects for the district council wards (the unit of
stratification) and the following control variables: total households per community, distance to nearest motorable
road, index of war exposure, and index of history of domestic slavery; and v) sample size varies between 225-236 for
all outcomes save the last, which is conditional on having used the tarp and has N = 161.
Table 4: Structured Community Activities (SCAs): Illustrative Treatment Effects
Panel A. Collective Action and the Building Materials Vouchers
Panel B. Participation in the Gift Choice Deliberation







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attended meeting to decide what to do with the tarp 0.812 -0.037+ (0.021) 236 H5
Everybody had equal say in deciding how to use the tarp 0.509 -0.106+ (0.058) 232 H5
Correctly able to name what the tarp was used for  0.589 -0.08+ (0.048) 236 H9
Community used the tarp (verified by physical assessment) 0.897 -0.079+ (0.044) 233 H4
Community can show research team the tarp 0.836 -0.116* (0.051) 232 H5
Respondent would like to be a member of the VDC 0.361 -0.043* (0.021) 236 H10
Current (or acting) village chief/Headman is younger than 35 0.044 -0.038+ (0.023) 229 H12
Respondent voted in the local government election (2008) 0.851 -0.036* (0.016) 236 H10
Community teachers have been trained 0.471 0.122+ (0.066) 173 H4
Respondent is a member of a women's group 0.235 0.060** (0.021) 236 H8
Someone took minutes at the most recent community meeting 0.295 0.140* (0.063) 227 H5
Building materials stored in a public place when not in use 0.128 0.246* (0.098) 84 H5
Chiefdom official did not have the most influence over tarpaulin use 0.543 0.058* (0.029) 236 H6
Respondent agrees with "Responsible young people can be good 
leaders" and not "Only older people are mature enough to be leaders"
0.762 0.038* (0.017) 236 H6, H12
Correctly able to name the Section Chief for this section 0.533 0.053+ (0.032) 234 H9
Correctly able to name the year of the next general elections 0.192 0.038* (0.018) 236 H9
Table 5: Erroneous Interpretations under "Cherry Picking"
Notes on table: i) significance levels indicated by + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01; ii) robust standard errors; iii) treatment
effects estimated on follow-up data; and iv) includes fixed effects for the disctrict council wards (the unit of stratification)
and the two balancing variables from the randomization (total households and distance to road) as controls.
Panel A: Institutions "Deteriorated"
Panel B: Institutions "Improved"